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TO KNOCK OR NOT TO KNOCK? NO-KNOCK
WARRANTS AND CONFRONTATIONAL
POLICING
BY BRIAN DOLAN†
Police are left to instigate violence as a means of resolving any
social deadlock, to add violence to situations they feel to be
ambiguous. But if we can really see, and see through, police, we
may see that this becomes a way of injecting testing violence [or
domination] into the heart of society in a public way. Police test
what violence we, as citizens, will allow, and against whom.
Small comfort, perhaps, since there is no guarantee that we will
oppose the wicked things that police may show us. Our
neighbors may support that wickedness. We may have no idea
how to fix it. Still, police violence differs from forms of violence
and domination that have no visible presence or public check.
The police measure out in public what the society will tolerate,
even to our shame.1

INTRODUCTION
Around 4 a.m. on December 5, 2017, a team of New York
City police officers, armed with a no-knock search warrant, broke
down ninety-two year-old Natalio Conde’s front door without
warning and began methodically searching his Bronx
apartment.2 Waking to the sound of people moving around his
home, Mr. Conde, in poor health and in no condition to tussle
†
J.D. 2019, St. John’s University School of Law. Many thanks are due to
Professor Kate Levine, who provided indispensable guidance and encouragement
throughout the writing process, as well as helpful feedback on early drafts. The
author would also like to thank the editorial board and staff members of the St.
John’s Law Review for their hard work towards getting this piece ready for
publication.
1
Mark Greif, Seeing Through Police, N+1 FOUNDATION, Spring 2015,
https://nplusonemag.com/issue-22/police/seeing-through-police/ (second emphasis
added).
2
James C. McKinley Jr., After Police Raids Kills Man, 69, Family Asks Why
Trigger Was Pulled, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
12/13/nyregion/nypd-police-shooting-bronx-mario-sanabria-lawsuit.html?smid=twshare&_r=1&mtrref=t.co.
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with intruders, became frightened and remained in bed,
motionless.3 From his bed, Mr. Conde saw a man pushing his
brother-in-law, 69-year-old Mario Sanabria, into the room.4 Mr.
Conde heard his brother-in-law ask, “What’s happening?” and
then heard a shot.5 The shot hit Mr. Sanabria in the chest and
killed him.6
A few months earlier, during the predawn hours of July 26,
2017, federal agents, armed with a no-knock search warrant,
picked the lock on the front door of former Trump campaign
chairman Paul Manafort’s home in Alexandria, Virginia, and
raided the house.7 In the wake of the raid, a number of
commentators expressed concern about the use of no-knock
warrants in connection with white-collar investigations.8 Since
the Manafort raid, these commentators have described no-knock
warrants as a “shock and awe” tactic,9 as a tool that strikes
terror in people’s hearts,10 and as more appropriate for going
after organized crime syndicates than white-collar criminals.11
Echoing these sentiments, Jonathan Turley, a professor at
George Washington University Law School, described the
Manafort raid as “gratuitous” and “excessive,” and stated that
“no-knock warrants were designed primarily for dangerous drug
dealers.”12 Moreover, he went on to say, “what did they think he
3

Id.
Id. The police alleged that Sanabria confronted them with a machete; Mr.
Conde said that he did not see a machete in Sanabria’s hand. Id. There was a
machete in the apartment, but Mr. Conde said it was a souvenir that belonged to
him, and that he did not think Sanabria knew it was there. Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. The police were looking for Mario Sanabria’s nephew, Miguel Conde, and
had information that there was a gun and narcotics in the apartment. Id. Miguel
Conde had not lived in the apartment for several months, and aside from the stub of
a marijuana cigarette and a pocketknife, the police found no weapons or narcotics.
Id.
7
Sharon LaFraniere et al., With a Search Warrant and a Threatened
Indictment, Mueller’s Inquiry Sets a Tone, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 18, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/us/politics/mueller-russia-investigation.html?_r=0.
8
Carol D. Leonnig et al., FBI Conducted Predawn Raid of Former Trump
Campaign Chairman Manafort’s Home, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-conducted-predawn-raid-of-former-trumpcampaign-chairman-manaforts-home/2017/08/09/5879fa9c-7c45-11e7-9d08b79f191668ed_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.0991546db134.
9
Id.
10
LaFraniere et al., supra note 7.
11
Id.
12
Law Scholar Says Manafort No-Knock Warrant ‘Excessive’, MSNBC,
http://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/law-scholar-says-manafort-no-knockwarrant-excessive-1022455363688.
4
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was going to do? Try to flush his laptop down the toilet or meet
them at the door with a Glock?”13 Others expressed the belief
that obtaining a no-knock search warrant is particularly difficult
and that magistrates subject search warrant applications to a
great deal of scrutiny.14 Finally, some suggested that no-knock
warrants are typically only used in the most serious criminal
investigations.15
It is puzzling that the use of a no-knock warrant against
Manafort drew such condemnation because the only remarkable
thing about the raid is how smoothly it went. There was no
property damage, nobody was injured or killed, and no shots
were fired.16 While the relatively tame Manafort raid garnered
widespread attention from various corners of the legal
profession17—no doubt because Manafort is a powerful,
well-connected member of the Washington establishment—the
Conde raid primarily drew condemnation from family members
of the victim.18
The above comments thus raise several issues regarding the
use of no-knock search warrants, which this Note discusses in
detail. First, no-knock warrants are, in general, gratuitous and
excessive, regardless of whether the target of the search is a
member of our society’s elite class like Manafort, or is an
ordinary citizen like Conde, because their execution involves a
substantial risk of violence to both homeowners and law
enforcement.19 Between 2010 and 2016, at least ninety-four
people died during the execution of no-knock search warrants,

13

Id.
Radley Balko, No-Knock Raids Like the One Against Paul Manafort are More
Common Than You Think, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/08/10/no-knock-raids-like-the-one-against-paulmanafort-are-more-common-than-you-think/?utm_term=.f49b264d28b4 [hereinafter
Balko, No-Knock Raids] (quoting author and legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin, who said,
“Magistrate judges don’t give authorizations for searches of people’s homes lightly. I
mean, this is a big deal.”); see also Leonnig et al., supra note 8 (“A federal judge
signing this warrant would demand persuasive evidence of probable cause that a
serious crime has been committed.”).
15
Id. (quoting Sen. Richard Blumenthal).
16
Compare LaFraniere et al., supra note 7, with McKinley Jr., supra note 2.
17
Supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text.
18
McKinley Jr., supra note 2 (“It was an injustice,” his sister said).
19
McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451, 460–61 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(describing forcible entry without announcement as “a method of law enforcement so
reckless and so fraught with danger and discredit to the law enforcement agencies
themselves”).
14

204

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:201

thirteen of whom were police officers.20
Nevertheless, the
comments above suggest no-knock warrants are only gratuitous
and excessive when used against well-heeled individuals
suspected of white-collar crimes, such as Manafort, but that the
risks are justified when investigating drug dealers and other
more “dangerous” criminals.
Second, Professor Turley’s
comments directly conflate drug dealers with violence and
danger to police—a relationship that is not supported by
empirical evidence.21 Despite the lack of empirical support, the
presumption that drugs and violence are directly related is
deeply rooted in our society,22 and this partially explains why
no-knock warrants are frequently used when police search for
drugs.23 Finally, the above comments suggest that applications
for no-knock warrants are put under much greater judicial
scrutiny than is actually the case.24
20
Kevin Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids Leave a Trail of Blood, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/18/us/forced-entrywarrant-drug-raid.html [hereinafter Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids].
21
Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 278–279 (2015)
(discussing the lack of empirical evidence of a direct relationship between drugs and
violence, and summarizing research suggesting that drug-related violence is more
closely related to other factors such as environment, personality, or age).
22
Id. at 246–252, 255–264 (describing politicians’ “War on Drugs” rhetoric and
its effect on public perception of linking drugs and violence, and also discussing case
law and statutes that rely on the perceived link between drugs and violence).
23
See id. at 267–268 (noting that, in the context of no-knock warrants, courts
readily assume officer safety is threatened in drug cases); Radley Balko, Opinion,
Little Rock’s Dangerous and Illegal Drug War, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/10/14/little-rocksdangerous-and-illegal-drug-war/?utm_term=.41d32be5732c [hereinafter Balko, Little
Rock’s Drug War] (“[T]he narcotics unit appears to be routinely violating the Fourth
Amendment by serving nearly all of its warrants with no-knock raids.”); AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF
AMERICAN POLICING 33 (2014) [hereinafter ACLU, WAR COMES HOME] (reporting
findings that “[n]o-knock warrants were used (or probably used) in about 60 percent
of incidents in which SWAT teams were searching for drugs . . . .”); Peter B. Kraska
& Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of
Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. PROBS. 1, 8 n.8 (1997) (“Courts are more than willing to
issue ‘no-knock if necessary’ warrants, particularly in cases characterized as drugrelated.” (quoting Moss v. City of Colorado Springs, 871 F.2d 112, 133 (10th Cir.
1989)).
24
Richard Van Duizend, L. Paul Sutton, Charlotte A. Carter, NATIONAL CENTER
FOR STATE COURTS, THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS,
PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 26-27 (1984) (“The average length of the magisterial
review in the proceedings we observed was two minutes and forty-eight seconds. The
median time was two minutes and twelve seconds[,]” and ten percent were approved
in less than a minute. In addition, of the proceedings observed, only eight percent of
warrant applications were denied.); Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23
(“[The narcotics unit is] asking for no-knock warrants without demonstrating why
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This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by
explaining what no-knock warrants are and why they are used.
Part I then addresses recent state legislative efforts to reform
no-knock warrant use and argues that these efforts, however
well-intentioned, are insufficient. Part I will also provide a brief
history of how no-knock warrant use developed and gives an
overview of the current status of state law regarding no-knock
warrants. Part II argues that, contrary to the arguments of
no-knock proponents, elimination of no-knock warrants and strict
adherence to the knock-and-announce requirement is a more
effective way to ensure the safety of both law enforcement
officers and civilians.
Part III proposes comprehensive
legislation that state legislatures can adopt to protect the safety
of law enforcement officers and civilians and to ensure that
citizens’ civil liberties are respected. Part III argues that the
most effective solution is for states to prohibit the use of no-knock
warrants, require execution of traditional search warrants
during daylight hours, and apply the exclusionary rule to
knock-and-announce violations.25
I.

A.

NO-KNOCK WARRANT USE BY STATE & LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT

What are No-Knock Warrants and Why are They Used?

A no-knock search warrant authorizes the executing officer’s
entrance of premises to be searched without giving notice of his
authority and purpose, usually upon reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing would be dangerous or would result in
the destruction of evidence.26 No-knock warrants differ from

each suspect merits a no-knock entry, as required by federal law. Worse yet, Little
Rock judges are then signing off on these warrants.”); see also Jessica Miller &
Aubrey Wieber, Warrants Approved in Just Minutes: Are Utah Judges Really
Reading Them Before Signing Off?, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2018/01/14/warrants-approved-in-just-minutes-areutah-judges-really-reading-them-before-signing-off/; Editorial, Getting a Warrant
Should Be Harder Than It Is, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.sltrib.com/opinion/editorial/2018/01/16/tribune-editorial-getting-awarrant-should-be-harder-than-it-is/ [hereinafter Editorial, Getting a Warrant].
25
See infra Part III.
26
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.35(4)(b) (McKinney 2017). See also
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (“In order to justify a ‘no-knock’
entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing
their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or

206

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:201

traditional search warrants because they authorize law
enforcement
to
dispense
with
the
common-law
“knock-and-announce” requirement. The knock-and-announce
requirement mandates that, before forcibly entering a private
residence to execute a search warrant, police must provide prior
notice of their authority and purpose, usually by knocking on the
door and announcing that they are police who are present to
execute a search warrant.27 Historically, the knock-and-announce
requirement was viewed as an indispensable protection for both
citizens and police, for homeowners against unreasonable
searches and seizures,28 and for law enforcement officers against
fearful homeowners who might mistake them for burglars or
prowlers.29 Other concerns underlying the knock-and-announce
requirement include protecting the individual’s right to privacy,
giving the homeowner the chance to redirect police officers at the
wrong address in cases of mistaken identity,30 providing an
opportunity for persons to comply with the law, avoiding property
damage,31 and giving people the chance to put on clothes or get
out of bed.32

that it would inhibit the effective investigation of crime by, for example, allowing the
destruction of evidence.”).
27
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958) (holding that “petitioner
could not be lawfully arrested in his home by officers breaking in without first giving
him notice of their authority and purpose”). The knock-and-announce requirement
has a long, established history at common law, both in the United States and in
England, and dates back to the thirteenth century. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S.
586, 605–06 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929
(1995) (holding that the principle of announcement is an element of the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment); Ker v. State of California,
374 U.S. 23, 54-55 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding that “no English decision which clearly recognizes any exception to the
requirement that the police first give notice of their authority and purpose before
forcibly entering a home”). The requirement is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2012).
28
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929.
29
Miller, 357 U.S. at 313 n.12; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
460–61 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
30
Ker, 374 U.S. at 57–58; Craig Hemmens & Chris Mathias, United States v.
Banks: The “Knock-and-Announce” Rule Returns to the Supreme Court, 41 IDAHO L.
REV. 1, 7–8 (2004).
31
Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5.
32
Id.; see also Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A
New Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685,
690–691 (1993) (describing four important purposes served by the knock-andannounce rule); Hemmens & Mathias, supra note 30, at 8.
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Where We Are Now: State-Level Efforts to Reform No-Knock
Warrant Use

In recent years, there has been growing public recognition
that no-knock raids are an unnecessarily aggressive and
intrusive law enforcement practice,33 and a couple of states, most
notably Utah and Georgia, have made legislative efforts to
address these concerns.34 For example, a pair of Georgia bills
proposed in 2015 would have required execution of no-knock
warrants between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. and would have required a
higher showing of proof before such warrants could be issued.35
In addition, the legislation would have required police to have an
“operational plan” for executing no-knock warrants and create a
training program related to applying for and executing no-knock
warrants.36

33
See, e.g., Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20; McKinley, supra note
2; Editorial, Risks Often Outweigh Benefits of No-Knock Search Warrants, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/opinion/editorial/editorialrisks-often-outweight-benefits-of-no-knock-search-warrants/article_6f6219d1-defe57b0-8ea0-a8668159b88a.html; Editorial, State Should Address No-Knock Raids,
CONCORD MONITOR (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.concordmonitor.com/The-danger-ofno-knock-raids-8822918; Dave Faherty, Channel 9 Investigates Controversial Use of
No-Knock Search Warrants, W-SOC TV (May 1, 2017), http://www.wsoctv.com/news/
9-investigates/channel-9-investigates-controversial-use-of-no-knock-search-warrants
/518161168; Editorial, Our View: Review Police Raids, OGDEN STANDARD-EXAMINER
(Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.standard.net/stories/2013/08/05/our-view-review-policeraids; David Koon, Shot in the Dark, ARKANSAS TIMES (Apr. 24, 2008),
https://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/shot-in-the-dark/Content?oid=948430.
34
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210(8) (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-8 (3)
(West 2015); S.B. 45, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015); H.B. 56, 153rd Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015); S.B. 94, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017).
Maryland is considering legislation designed to increase transparency regarding
no-knock warrant use. See Radley Balko, Maryland Legislature Mulls New SWAT
Transparency Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-watch/wp/2015/03/19/maryland-legislature-mulls-new-swat-transparencybill/ (noting that the Maryland legislature is currently considering a bill that would
require state and local law enforcement agencies to report “the legal authority,
including type of warrant, if any, for each activation and deployment [of a tactical
team]”).
35
S.B. 45, No. LC 29 6124, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015); H.B. 56,
No. LC 29 6134, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015).
36
S.B. 45, No. LC 29 6124, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015); H.B. 56,
No. LC 29 6134, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). The Georgia bills did not
pass but have since been reintroduced. S.B. 94, No. LC 29 7163, 154th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017). However, the revised bill only raises the standard of proof for
obtaining a no-knock warrant to probable cause; it does not require execution of
no-knock between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Id.
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Utah, for its part, amended its search warrant statute by
prohibiting no-knock warrants when the only crime suspected is
drug use, drug possession, or possession of drug paraphernalia.37
Utah also enacted a statute in 2014 that set forth reporting
requirements regarding the use of tactical groups and forcible
entry to execute search warrants, making Utah the only state
with a law requiring all law enforcement agencies to report all
instances of forced entry into a private residence.38 That statute
also requires law enforcement agencies to report the type of
warrant obtained and the name of the magistrate who authorized
the warrant, among other information, each time a tactical group
is deployed or police officers use forcible entry.39
While these legislative efforts are laudable, they miss the
mark and fail to adequately respond to concerns about no-knock
warrants in ways that will make a practical difference for
civilians and law enforcement officers. For instance, the Georgia
proposals would have been far more meaningful if they required
the execution of traditional search warrants between 6 a.m. and
10 p.m. because that would increase the likelihood that residents
actually hear the police when they knock and announce their
presence, giving residents a real opportunity to answer the door
and comply.40 On the other hand, requiring execution of noknock warrants between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. misses the point
entirely. Indeed, it is not farfetched to imagine that this
37
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210(8) (West 2018). Utah Representative Marc
Roberts plans to introduce H.B. 83 in 2018, which would require judges to place noknock warrant applications under stricter scrutiny. Jessica Miller & Aubrey Wieber,
Utah Cops Would Have to Answer More Questions Before Getting a No-Knock
Warrant, Under New Proposal, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2018),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2018/01/14/utah-cops-would-have-to-answer-morequestions-before-getting-a-no-knock-warrant-under-new-proposal/. The bill would
also prohibit using force to enter a home if the suspect is only accused of possession
with the intent to distribute, but would still allow for forcible entry upon a showing
of probable cause that a suspect was actually selling drugs. Id.
38
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-8.5 (West 2014); Radley Balko, Data Show That in
Utah, SWAT-Style Tactics Are Overwhelmingly Used to Serve Drug Warrants, WASH.
POST (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/08/
17/data-show-that-in-utah-swat-style-tactics-are-overwhelmingly-used-to-servedrug-warrants/?utm_term=.990b2cf8005a [hereinafter Balko, Utah Data].
39
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-8.5 (West 2014).
40
Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38 (noting that knock-and-announce raids at
night are, in effect, indistinguishable from no-knock raids); see also Jacob Sullum,
Hasty Drug Warriors Are a Menace, REASON (Jan. 28, 2015), http://reason.com/
archives/2015/01/28/hasty-drug-warriors-are-a-menace (arguing that the proposed
Georgia legislation might not have prevented the tragedy that inspired its
introduction).
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requirement could actually increase the risk of violent
confrontation because homeowners are more likely to be alert
and awake. Such a requirement also makes little difference for
people who sleep past 6 a.m. or go to sleep before 10 p.m.—who
are just as likely to be asleep as others would be in the middle of
the night.41
Reform efforts calling for increased training and operational
planning are sound in theory, but it is unlikely that any amount
of training and operational planning can eliminate the potential
for violent confrontations when police crash through the front
door of private residences and frighten the people inside.42 The
reporting and transparency requirements are a welcome
development, but eliminating the use of no-knock warrants
would be a far more helpful measure than simply gathering data
on their use.
One other noteworthy development out of Utah is a bill
introduced in the House earlier this year. The bill would require
that, before seeking a warrant, a supervisory official perform an
independent risk assessment using the officer’s affidavit and
other relevant information to “evaluate the totality of the
circumstances and ensure reasonable intelligence gathering
efforts have been made.”43 The bill would also require that the
relied-upon affidavit describe all investigative activities
undertaken to ensure that the correct address is identified and
that potential harm to innocent third-parties, the property, and
the officers is minimized.44
The Utah Legislature’s decision to prohibit no-knock
warrants in drug possession cases is the most significant of the
reform efforts to date. No-knock warrants have become a regular
feature of serious and not-so-serious drug investigations alike.45
However, this reform falls short because it still leaves open the
possibility that no-knock warrants will be used against those
41
See, e.g., Jessica Miller, Police Detail What Went Wrong in Fatal Shootout
with Matthew David Stewart, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jul. 17, 2014),
http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=58190599&itype=CMSID [hereinafter Miller,
Fatal Shootout] (describing violent confrontation resulting from no-knock warrant
executed around 8:30 p.m. while suspect, who worked the overnight shift, was
sleeping).
42
See infra Section II.A.
43
H.B. 83, 2018 Leg., 62nd Sess. (Utah 2018).
44
Id.
45
Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38; see also sources cited supra note 23; Sack,
Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20; Koon, supra note 33; Miller, Fatal
Shootout, supra note 41.
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suspected of selling drugs, even if they are small-time, as well as
scores of other nonviolent suspects.46 There is grave danger to
both civilians and police officers whenever no-knock entries are
executed.47 While more transparency is generally welcomed in
the realm of policing and increased training is a step in the right
direction, neither of these solutions addresses the reality that
no-knock warrants are inherently dangerous for both police and
civilians. No amount of after-the-fact review can undo the
damage occasioned by no-knock raids that go sideways.
If states wish to create meaningful reform, state legislatures
should prohibit no-knock warrants, mandate strict compliance
with the knock-and-announce requirement, require execution of
traditional search warrants during daylight hours, and authorize
application of the exclusionary rule for knock-and-announce
violations.48 Unfortunately, legislative efforts thus far have been
largely reactive and state legislators have been too reluctant to
take action until tragedy strikes.49 It is imperative that states
begin to take proactive legislative measures to rein in the use of
no-knock warrants.

46
See, e.g., Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20 (reporting use of noknock warrants in investigations of illegal poker games, brewing moonshine, and
neglecting pets); Sarah Fenske, City to Change “Nuisance Property” Policy After NoKnock Raid on Wrong House, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.river
fronttimes.com/newsblog/2018/08/20/city-to-change-nuisance-property-policy-afterno-knock-raid-on-wrong-house (describing St. Louis’s “Project 87,” which used noknock warrants to enter “nuisance properties,” whose residents were typically cited
for minor code violations).
47
See infra Part II.A.
48
See infra Part III.
49
The Georgia bills were precipitated by a botched raid in which a flash-bang
grenade was thrown into the crib of a nineteen-month-old infant, severely injuring
him and requiring him to be placed in a medically induced coma. Jon Richards, HB
56 Hopes to Regulate No-Knock Warrants, PEACH PUNDIT (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.peachpundit.com/2015/02/26/hb-56-hopes-to-regulate-no-knockwarrants/; Alecia Phonesavanh, A SWAT Team Blew a Hole in my 2-Year-Old Son,
SALON (Jun. 24, 2014) https://www.salon.com/2014/06/24/a_swat_team_blew_a_
hole_in_my_2_year_old_son/. The Utah amendments and statutes were largely a
response to a 2012 incident in Ogden, Utah, during which one officer was killed and
five others were wounded while executing a no-knock warrant on the home of a
small-time marijuana grower named Matthew David Stewart, a military veteran
suffering from PTSD, who did not even sell his product. Radley Balko, How a Drug
Raid Gone Wrong Sparked a Call for Change in the Unlikeliest State in the Nation,
HUFFINGTON. POST (Oct. 24, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/24/
utah-drug-raid-matthew-david-stewart_n_4138252.html. See also Miller, Fatal
Shootout, supra note 41.
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The Early Federal Experience with No-Knock Warrants

The origins of no-knock warrants can be traced to the Nixon
administration and the early days of the War on Drugs.50 In
1970, Congress authorized federal magistrates to issue no-knock
warrants to federal law enforcement officers. According to
proponents, strict adherence to the knock-and-announce rule
allowed drug dealers to destroy evidence and denied police the
element of surprise, thereby increasing the danger officers face
when executing search warrants in drug investigations.51
However, no-knock warrants proved so problematic that
Congress repealed the statute authorizing their use four years
later based on extensive newspaper reporting describing
mistaken, violent, and often illegal raids carried out by law
enforcement officers searching for drugs.52 This is unsurprising,
since the use of no-knock warrants, like the War on Drugs itself,
was always more about politics than effectiveness.53 However, a
number of War on Drugs policies created significant incentives
for state and local law enforcement to participate in counter-drug
activities54 and drastically increased the number of state and
local police departments with SWAT teams and similar
paramilitary-style units.55 The rise of SWAT teams and similar
50
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 509, 84 Stat. 1236, 1274, (previously codified at 21 U.S.C. § 879(b) (1970)).
See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S
POLICE FORCES 83–84, 90 (2014) [hereinafter BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP];
DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF
FAILURE 6–7 (1996).
51
Garcia, supra note 32, at 703.
52
Id. at 705.
53
BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP, supra note 50, at 104–05 (discussing the
creation of a new federal agency “to show off the . . . administration’s showpiece
crime tools,” such as no-knock raids, and “generate empty but impressive-sounding
arrest statistics Nixon could tout”). See also generally BAUM, supra note 50.
54
See generally BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP, supra note 51, at 157. See
also, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub.
L. 101–189, § 1208 (1989) (authorizing transfer of military hardware from the
Department of Defense to federal and state agencies for use in counter-drug
activities); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. 104–
201, 110 Stat. 2422, § 1033 (1996). President Barack Obama attempted to rein in
this program, albeit only very slightly. See Exec. Order No. 13688, 80 Fed. Reg. 3451
(Jan. 16, 2015) (blocking transfer of armored vehicles, large-caliber weapons,
ammunition, and other heavy equipment). However, President Obama’s executive
order was revoked by President Donald Trump. Exec. Order No. 13809, 82 Fed. Reg.
41499 (Aug. 28, 2017).
55
Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 23, at 6 (reporting that between the early1980s and mid-1990s, the percentage of cities with “police paramilitary unit[s]”
increased by approximately thirty to thirty-eight percent). Other research indicates
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paramilitary units is important because these units are
frequently used to execute no-knock warrants,56 and they are
typically armed with equipment that increases the
confrontational nature of no-knock warrant execution and
increases the danger inherent in the execution of such
warrants.57 It is also not unusual for members of SWAT teams to
wear plain clothes that fail to clearly identify them as police
officers, further adding to homeowners’ confusion when they
come crashing through the door.58
D. The End of the Knock-and-Announce Requirement
A series of United States Supreme Court cases in the 1990s
and early 2000s played an important role in clearing the way for
state and local law enforcement to use no-knock warrants. In
Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held that, while the
common law principle of announcement is an element of the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry, countervailing law
enforcement interests, such as reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing would create danger for officers or
result in the destruction of evidence, may sometimes justify an
that by the mid-2000s, almost eighty percent of small towns had a SWAT team.
ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 19.
56
See Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23; Kraska & Kappeler, supra
note 23, at 7 (reporting that, in 1995, 75.9 percent of the activity SWAT-style units
engaged in was drug raids, consisting almost exclusively of no-knock entries).
57
Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23 (“[T]he [Little Rock Police
Department] is serving many of these [no-knock] warrants by using explosives that
SWAT veterans I’ve interviewed say are reckless, dangerous and wholly
inappropriate for use in drug raids.”); Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 23, at 3
(noting that police paramilitary units commonly possess “an array of ‘less-thanlethal’ technology for conducting ‘dynamic entries,’ (e.g., serving a search warrant).
These include percussion grenades (explosive devices designed to disorient
residents), stinger grenades (similar devices containing rubber pellets), CS and OC
gas grenades (tear gas), and shotgun launched bean-bag systems (nylon bags of lead
shot). ‘Dynamic entries’ require apparatuses for opening doors, including battering
rams, hydraulic door-jamb spreaders, and C4 explosives. Some [police paramilitary
units] purchase and incorporate a range of ‘fortified tactical vehicles,’ including
military armored personnel carriers and specially equipped ‘tactical cruisers.’ ”).
However, this “less-than-lethal” equipment has resulted in death, injury, and
extensive property damage during no-knock raids. See ACLU, WAR COMES HOME,
supra note 23, at 21; Phonesavanh, supra note 49.
58
Radley Balko, A South Carolina Anti-Drug Police Unit Admitted it Conducts
Illegal No-Knock Raids, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-watch/wp/2018/05/31/a-south-carolina-anti-drug-police-unit-admittedit-conducts-illegal-no-knock-raids/?utm_term=.8ba8f5800596 (“The officers are
permitted to wear what they like on raids, and often mix official gear with personal
items, and there’s no uniformity.”).
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unannounced entry.59 Two years later, in Richards v. Wisconsin,
the Court explicitly approved of states giving magistrates the
authority to issue no-knock warrants.60 Before long, courts
nationwide began relying on Richards in upholding searches
conducted pursuant to no-knock warrants.61 And, despite the
Court’s
rejection
of
a
blanket
exception
to
the
knock-and-announce
requirement
for
felony
drug
investigations,62 no-knock warrants are, to this day, primarily
used in drug investigations.63 Finally, in 2006, the Supreme
Court held that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to evidence
obtained as a result of knock-and-announce violations,64 thereby
removing the only real insurance of police compliance with the
knock-and-announce requirement.65
E.

The Legal Status of No-Knock Warrants Among the States
Today

Most states have a knock-and-announce statute on the books
requiring that police give notice of their authority and purpose
and be refused admittance before they may forcibly enter a

59

514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).
520 U.S. 385, 396 n.7 (1997) (stating that the practice of states giving
magistrates the authority to issue no-knock warrants is reasonable when officers
provide reasonable suspicion that entry without prior announcement would be
appropriate).
61
Memorandum Opinion from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Att’y. Gen.
Off. of Legal Couns., Re: Authority of Fed. Judges and Magistrates to Issue “NoKnock” Warrants for the Chief Couns., Drug Enforcement Admin. 49 (June 12, 2002)
(listing post-Richards cases upholding no-knock search warrants issued by state
court magistrates).
62
Richards, 520 U.S. at 395.
63
Jessica Pishko, How A No-Knock Raid in Austin Turned Into a Lethal
Shootout, The Appeal (Feb. 5, 2019), https://theappeal.org/how-a-no-knock-raid-inaustin-turned-into-a-lethal-shootout/ (“No-knock raids – in which SWAT teams
arrive with armored personnel carriers and forcefully enter a residence wearing
body armor and using flash-bang grenades – have become a signature of the socalled war on drugs.”); Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38. See generally supra note 23.
64
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
65
Id. at 609 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Without such a rule . . . police know that
they can ignore the Constitution’s requirements without risking suppression of
evidence discovered after an unreasonable entry.”); see also Christopher Totten &
Sutham Cobkit, The Knock-and-Announce Rule and Police Arrests: Evaluating
Alternative Deterrents to Exclusion for Rule Violations, 48 UNIV. OF S.F. L. REV. 71,
102 (2013) (reporting that the majority of police chiefs perceive exclusion as having a
substantial impact in preventing knock-and-announce violations and suggesting
that courts may want to reconsider the role that exclusion can serve in deterring
knock-and-announce violations).
60
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residence.66 These statutes are generally modeled on the federal
knock-and-announce statute.67 However, both state and federal
courts generally interpret the statutory knock-and-announce
codifications as incorporating the common law exceptions to the
rule, including destruction of evidence and danger to officers.68 A
small minority of state legislatures have enacted statutes
expressly granting magistrates the authority to issue no-knock
warrants upon reasonable suspicion that announcement would
endanger the safety of any person or result in the destruction of
evidence.69 In addition, because many state courts interpret their
knock-and-announce statutes as incorporating the common law
exceptions, many state courts have held that magistrates may
issue no-knock warrants in the absence of explicit statutory
authority upon an appropriate showing that exigent
circumstances exist.70 Therefore, whether by statute or as a
result of the common law exceptions to the knock-and-announce
requirement, state magistrates have the authority to issue
no-knock search warrants in a significant majority of states.71

66
Garcia, supra note 32, at 691 n.39; see also Michael R. Sonnenreich & Stanley
Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 626, 654–59 (1970) (compiling state knock-and-announce statutes).
67
Garcia, supra note 32, at 691 n.39; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2012) (“The
officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a
house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate
himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.”)
68
G. Todd Butler, Note, Recipe for Disaster: Analyzing the Interplay Between the
Castle Doctrine and the Knock-and-Announce Rule after Hudson v. Michigan, 27
MISS. C. L. REV. 435, 438 (2009).
69
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.35 (McKinney 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 29-29-01 (West 2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1045 (West 1981); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-411 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3915 (2017).
70
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scalise, 439 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Mass. 1982) (“[T]he
decision whether to dispense with the requirement of announcement should be left
to judicial officers, whenever police have sufficient information at the time of
application for a warrant to justify such a request.”); State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833,
838 (Minn. 1978); State v. Henderson, 629 N.W.2d 613, 622 (Wis. 2001) (“In
Wisconsin, judicial officers are authorized to issue no-knock warrants.”); Poole v.
State, 596 S.E.2d 420, 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); White v. State, 746 So. 2d 953, 956
(Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding issuance of a no-knock warrant despite repeal of
statute authorizing no-knock warrants because “Mississippi has no statute which
specifically prohibits ‘no-knock’ warrants, and our case law has never prohibited the
issuance of ‘no-knock warrants.’ ”); State v. Johnson, 775 A.2d 1273, 1278–79 (N.J.
2001).
71
See Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20 (pointing out that
no-knock warrants are routinely granted in a majority of states).
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Estimates of the number of no-knock warrants issued each year
range from 20,000 to 80,000.72
At the time of this writing, only Oregon and Florida have
expressly denied magistrates the authority to issue no-knock
warrants.73 In addition to the severe risk of violence to both
occupants and police74 and the disastrous results of the federal
experiment with no-knock warrants,75 the Supreme Court of
Florida noted that no-knock warrants are strongly disfavored
because whether or not an exigency justifying a no-knock entry
exists must necessarily be assessed on the scene at the time the
warrant is executed.76 The Court of Appeals of Oregon expressed
similar concerns in holding that state magistrates cannot validly
Some states that authorize
issue no-knock warrants.77
magistrates to issue no-knock warrants, such as Massachusetts
and Minnesota, require officers to “make a threshold reappraisal”
of whether the relevant exigency still exists before executing a
no-knock warrant, and if the exigency no longer exists, the
no-knock authorization is void.78

72
See Dara Lind, Cops Do 20,000 No-Knock Raids a Year. Civilians Often Pay
the Price When They Go Wrong., VOX (May 15, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2014/
10/29/7083371/swat-no-knock-raids-police-killed-civilians-dangerous-work-drugs;
Brad Petrishen, SWAT Raids, “No-Knocks” on Rise in Frequency and Profile,
WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.telegram.com/
article/20150829/NEWS/150829129.
73
OR. REV. STAT. § 133.575 (West 2018); State v. Arce, 730 P.2d 1260, 1261 n.3
(Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that “the purported authorization in [the] warrant for a
‘no-knock entry was necessarily void’ ” because Oregon has a statutory
knock-and announce rule and “[a] magistrate may not authorize the police–or
anyone else–to perform an illegal act”); State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048, 1050–51
(Fla. 1994) (“No statutory authority exists under Florida law for issuing a no-knock
search warrant.”). In addition, the chief of the Houston Police Department in
Houston, Texas, announced in February 2019 that the department would “largely
end the practice of forcibly entering homes to search them without warning." Mihir
Zaveri, Houston Police to End Use of ‘No-Knock’ Warrants After Deadly Drug Raid,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/no-knockwarrant-houston-police.html. This announcement came after a drug raid that “might
have been based on faulty information,” during which “two civilians were killed and
four officers were shot[.]” Id.
74
Bamber, 630 So.2d at 1050.
75
Id. at 1050 n.4.
76
Id. at 1050 (noting that circumstances may change dramatically after a
search warrant is issued but before it is executed).
77
Arce, 730 P.2d. at 1262 (stating that the constitutional exceptions to the
knock-and-announce requirement necessarily depend on the circumstances existing
at the time a warrant is executed).
78
Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. 413, 421 (1982); State v. Lien, 265
N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn. 1978).

216

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:201

The next section of this Note will analyze the risks and
dangers associated with the use of no-knock warrants. Further,
the next section will argue that, contrary to the arguments
no-knock proponents set forth, no-knock warrants likely increase
the danger to both civilians and law enforcement when compared
to traditional search warrants executed in compliance with the
common law knock-and-announce requirement.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH NO-KNOCK WARRANTS
As
previously
discussed,
the
knock-and-announce
requirement was historically viewed as indispensable for a
variety of reasons, such as ensuring the safety of both
homeowners and law enforcement personnel, avoiding property
damage, providing homeowners with the opportunity to
voluntarily comply with the law, allowing the homeowner to
redirect police who are at the wrong address, and protecting the
right to privacy.79 This section will address each of these
concerns and argue that the best way to ensure the safety of both
police officers and civilians, as well as to protect individuals’ civil
liberties, is for states to eliminate the use of no-knock warrants
and require strict adherence to the knock-and-announce
requirement.
A.

No-Knock Warrants Fail to Truly Ensure the Safety of
Civilians & Officers

The danger of no-knock search warrants is best illustrated
by a hypothetical. Under cover of complete darkness, police
officers dressed in dark, tactical gear and armed with
military-grade weapons execute a no-knock search warrant by
smashing in the front door of a private residence and charge in,
guns raised.80 The homeowner, waking from his slumber,
frightened, and believing the intruders are burglars or people
wishing to harm his family, retrieves a weapon and confronts the
intruders.
Sometimes the police fire first, sometimes the
homeowner fires first, and sometimes the manner of entry itself
causes injury, but too often, someone ends up wounded or dead.81
79

See discussion supra Part I.A and accompanying notes.
See Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20.
81
This hypothetical is an amalgam of common elements present in the
execution of no-knock warrants. See, e.g., Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra
note 20; see also Kolby K. Reddish, Comment, A Clash of Doctrines: The Castle
Doctrine and the Knock-and-Announce Rule, 25 WIDENER L.J. 171, 173–174 (2016).
80
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Even when no one is hurt, there is usually property damage,82
not to mention the lingering trauma that such an event can
produce.83
One significant reason no-knock warrants are so dangerous
is that they clash with the castle doctrine and other defense of
habitation statutes.84 The castle doctrine, adopted in nearly all
fifty states, authorizes a person attacked in his or her home to
use force in self-defense without retreating85 and creates a
presumption that a homeowner’s use of force against intruders is
justified to protect the homeowner’s safety.86 As noted earlier,
magistrates also have the authority to issue no-knock warrants
in a majority of states.87 Therefore, in many jurisdictions, state
law simultaneously authorizes police to forcefully intrude into
private residences without warning and allows homeowners to
use force against a person or persons they reasonably believe to
be unlawful intruders committing a forcible felony.
In addition, the Second Amendment protects the right of
individuals to keep guns in the home for the purpose of
immediate self-defense.88
Approximately forty percent of
Americans either currently own a gun or live with someone who
does, and nearly two-thirds of gun owners cite personal
protection as a major reason for owning a gun.89 The conflict
between no-knock warrants, the castle doctrine, and the rate of
gun ownership is a dangerous cocktail that creates an inherent
82

See ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 37.
See Phonesavanh, supra note 49.
84
See, e.g., Reddish, supra note 81, at 172–73; Dimitri Epstein, Note, Cops or
Robbers? How Georgia’s Defense of Habitation Statute Applies to No-Knock Raids by
Police, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 585, 587–88 (2010); Butler, supra note 68, at 435.
85
See Reddish, supra note 81, at 175, 177.
86
See Butler, supra note 68, at 449. Some states, such as Florida, revoke the
presumption of necessary force when the intruder is a police officer, even when the
homeowner subjectively believes the person entering is an intruder. Id. at 450.
However, Florida recognizes the presumption of necessary force when a homeowner
uses force against an officer who violates the knock-and-announce rule. Id. As
discussed supra Part I.D, Florida is one of two states that has thus far refused to
authorize no-knock warrants.
87
See supra Part I.D.
88
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). See also John D.
Castiglione, Another Heller Conundrum: Is It a Fourth Amendment “Exigent
Circumstance” to Keep a Legal Firearm in Your Home?, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
230, 234 (2012); SpearIt, Firepower to the People! Gun Rights & The Law of SelfDefense to Curb Police Misconduct, 85 TENN. L. REV. 189, 229 n.217 (2017).
89
Kim Parker et al., The Demographics of Gun Ownership, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (June 22, 2017), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/06/22/the-demo
graphics-of-gun-ownership/.
83
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risk of harm any time police force entry into a private residence
without first knocking and announcing their authority and
purpose. The principles underlying the castle doctrine, like those
underlying the knock-and-announce rule, are based upon the
sanctity of the home as a place where individuals should be free
from unlawful intrusion.90 Because the knock-and-announce rule
and the castle doctrine are based on similar legal and historical
principles, the most harmonious way to resolve the tension
between them and reduce the risk of violence created by
no-knock warrants is for states to eliminate the use of no-knock
warrants
and
require
strict
adherence
to
the
knock-and-announce requirement.
The clash between the castle doctrine and the
knock-and-announce rule is not the only reason no-knock
warrants are dangerous. When executing a no-knock warrant,
the manner of entry itself can result in injury or death to persons
inside the house.91 This is, in part, a result of the militarization
of America’s state and local forces, a trend that has been
comprehensively documented by a number of scholars.92 Today,
as a result of this trend, state and local police departments have
near unfettered access to surplus military equipment,93 and it is
not uncommon for police to use devices like flash-bang grenades
while executing no-knock warrants.94 These devices, designed to
90
See U.S. CONST. amends. III, IV, V; see also Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the
Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 654, 667
(2003) (“[S]tanding one’s ground is allowed to protect the sanctity of [the] home,
which has been violated by someone who intends great bodily harm or death to the
resident.”); sources cited supra note 32.
91
See, e.g., Phonesavanh, supra note 49; Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra
note 20; William K. Rashbaum, Woman Dies After Police Mistakenly Raid Her
Apartment, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/17/
nyregion/woman-dies-after-police-mistakenly-raid-her-apartment.html.
92
See generally, e.g., BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP, supra note 50; Cadman
R. Kiker III, From Mayberry to Ferguson: The Militarization of American Policing
Equipment, Culture, and Mission, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 282 passim
(2015); Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 23, at 3–4. See also Seth W. Stoughton,
Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
611, 641–47 (2016). The militarization trend is relevant to the no-knock warrant
discussion because military equipment is often used during the execution of noknock warrants and the introduction of military culture into policing informs the
attitude of police officers during warrant execution. See, e.g., ACLU, WAR COMES
HOME, supra note 23, at 22–23; Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 23, at 11–14.
93
Kiker III, supra note 92, at 287.
94
ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 21. See also Balko, Little Rock’s
Drug War, supra note 23 (noting that the Little Rock Police Department routinely
served no-knock warrants by using explosives described by SWAT veterans as “a
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disorient persons inside the home, have burned small children,
set fire to houses, and caused fatal heart attacks.95 In addition to
the risk of injury to persons inside, executing a no-knock warrant
frequently involves extensive property damage, and it is unlikely
that residents of homes damaged during no-knock entries will
ever be reimbursed for necessary repairs.96
Proponents of no-knock warrants argue that rapidly entering
a residence and catching suspects by surprise is the best way to
simultaneously ensure both the safety of officers and others and
ensure that evidence is not destroyed.97 Others argue that the
privacy protections afforded by strict adherence to the
knock-and-announce requirement are “tenuous” when compared
to the potential for destruction of evidence and public harm,
especially in light of the growth of organized crime and drug
trafficking.98 Moreover, proponents of no-knock warrants argue
that knocking and announcing is a mere formality because entry
must always be permitted after police knock and announce their
presence.99 Finally, law enforcement officials tend to dismiss
concerns about botched no-knock raids as isolated incidents
rather than as examples of how dangerous the tactic is.100
First, proponents of no-knock warrants underestimate the
danger to both officers and civilians associated with no-knock

threat to anyone inside the targeted residence,” as well as “reckless, dangerous, and
wholly inappropriate” for drug raids and quoting a retired police officer who stated,
“If [the suspect] had heard someone outside the door and gotten up to see who was
there, he might well be dead.”). Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical
Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 257 n.222 (2017) (“No-knock
warrants, . . . are often executed using ‘dynamic entry’ tactics,” in which officers use
specialized battering rams and explosives, such as flash-bang grenades, with the
goal of disorienting people inside the location).
95
Garrett and Stoughton, supra note 94 at 257 n.222.
96
ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 21–22 (reporting that, at
minimum, fifty percent of incidents studied involved property damage and none of
the incident reports suggested homeowners would be reimbursed for repairs).
97
Wesley E. Nunn, Opinion, No-Knock Warrants a Valuable Tool, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (June 18, 2014), https://www.ajc.com/news/opinion/knockwarrants-valuable-tool/Tcl4g5l8uJZgwixfhANnjJ/; Donald B. Allegro, Note, Police
Tactics, Drug Trafficking, And Gang Violence: Why the No-Knock Warrant is an Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 552, 553 (1989).
98
Sonnenreich & Ebner, supra note 66, at 647.
99
Id.
100
RADLEY BALKO, OVERKILL: THE RISE OF PARAMILITARY POLICE RAIDS IN
AMERICA 51 (2006) [hereinafter BALKO, OVERKILL].
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entries.101 The argument that no-knock warrants ensure the
safety of officers and civilians is strange given that history and
precedent have repeatedly recognized the contrary assertion:
that compliance with the knock-and-announce requirement
protects officers by ensuring they are not mistaken for burglars
or trespassers, and minimizes the likelihood of violent
confrontations between homeowners and police by making
homeowners aware of the officers’ presence.102
In recent years, time and time again, police have frightened
homeowners while executing no-knock warrants in the middle of
the night with the homeowners responding violently and
predictably.103 The way most no-knock warrants are executed
increases the likelihood of violent confrontation, reflected in the
growing evidence of no-knock warrants’ danger, 104 and the body
of evidence demonstrating the danger of using no-knock warrants
has been growing for years.105 Between 2010 and 2016, at least
ninety-four people died during the execution of no-knock search
warrants, thirteen of whom were police officers.106 However, the
number is likely much higher because until 2015, no state
required police agencies to report incidents of forced entry into
private residences or what type of warrant was used; to date,
only one state requires this information.107 Therefore, even
though they are probably under-reported,108 instances of
no-knock warrants resulting in injury or death to civilians and
law enforcement are demonstrably not isolated incidents, and
101

Id. at 63–81 (providing a non-exhaustive list of no-knock raids between 1995
and 2006 that resulted in the injury or death of innocent bystanders or law
enforcement officers, or both).
102
See, e.g., McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451, 460–61 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“Many home-owners in this crime-beset city doubtless are armed. When
a woman sees a strange man, in plain clothes, prying up her bedroom window and
climbing in, her natural impulse would be to shoot . . . [b]ut an officer seeing a gun
being drawn on him might shoot first.”).
103
See Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20; Reddish, supra note 81;
Epstein, supra note 84; Butler, supra note 68 at 449–50; Kevin Sack, Murder or SelfDefense if Officer is Killed in Raid?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/18/us/texas-no-knock-warrantdrugs.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=storyheading&module=second-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0
[hereinafter Sack, Murder or Self-Defense?].
104
BALKO, OVERKILL, supra note 100, at 32.
105
See, e.g., id. at 63–81.
106
Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20.
107
Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38.
108
See supra Part I.A discussing the lack of laws requiring police to report how
often no-knock warrants are used.
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more importantly, it is far from clear that no-knock warrants
actually ensure the safety of officers.
At the same time, proponents of no-knocks overestimate the
danger of complying with the knock-and-announce requirement
and the necessity of no-knock warrants.109 No-knock warrants
are primarily used in drug investigations.110 This is due, in part,
to the fact that the general public strongly associates drugs with
violence.111 In the context of no-knock warrants, courts presume
officer safety is threatened in drug-related investigations.112
Indeed, after police used a no-knock warrant against Paul
Manafort,113 one commentator was quick to suggest that noknock warrants were “ ‘gratuitous’ and ‘excessive’ ” in whitecollar investigations but appropriate for “dangerous drug
dealers” who might “meet [officers] at the door with a Glock[.]”114
The exceptions to the Fourth Amendment and expansion of police
power that ultimately led states to authorize the use of no-knock
warrants were based, in large part, on these kinds of
assumptions about the relationship between guns, drugs, and
violence.115 However, empirical support for a direct, causal
relationship between drugs and violence is decidedly lacking.116
Research shows that there is less violence associated with drug
Moreover, the
trafficking than is typically assumed.117
109

See generally Baradaran, supra note 21.
Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38. One journalist laid this problem bare in
stark terms:
Every no-knock affidavit I reviewed included boilerplate language about
exigent circumstances. Word for word, the detectives included the same
verbiage about how drug dealers typically have access to guns and are
inherently dangerous, and how the surprise tactics of a no-knock, dynamic
entry will make it safer for the officers serving the warrant and everyone
inside. And again, in 95 of the 103 no-knock warrants
granted, the boilerplate language was all that the police relied upon to
request – and receive – a no-knock warrant.
Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23.
111
Baradaran, supra note 21, at 235–64; see also Benjamin Levin, Guns and
Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2200–01 (2016) (“This rhetorical link between
drug crime and violent crime has effectively elided the distinction, practically
rendering it moot.”).
112
Baradaran, supra note 21, at 253 n.153, 267–68; Balko, Little Rock’s Drug
War, supra note 23.
113
See supra Introduction.
114
Law Scholar says Manafort No-Knock Warrant ‘Excessive’, supra note 12.
115
Levin, supra note 111, at 2201–02 (arguing that the perceived violence of the
drug trade and a concern for officer safety have shaped courts’ approval of
aggressive police practices).
116
Baradaran, supra note 21, at 278–79.
117
Id. at 281.
110
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overwhelming majority of inmates in jail on drug charges do not
have a violent criminal record118 and are among the least likely to
be rearrested for a violent crime while on pretrial release.119
Therefore, the use of no-knock warrants in drug investigations is
based on strongly held assumptions about the violent nature of
drug users and drug dealers rather than on actual evidence that
such suspects are likely to be dangerous to officers. Since noknock search warrants are primarily used in drug
investigations,120 and it is not clear that they are actually
necessary or serve the purpose their proponents claim they serve
in that context, no-knock warrants are an unnecessary and
dangerous tool that should be abandoned.
Finally, while it is true that a homeowner must always
permit police to enter after officers knock and announce their
presence and present a valid search warrant, it is also completely
beside the point. The knock-and-announce requirement serves
many purposes, all of them important. The one purpose it
decidedly does not serve is keeping police out of the house, as
history and precedent have made clear.121
Knocking and
announcing may be a mere formality, but it is a formality that
should be respected and observed if states are serious about
ensuring the safety of civilians and police officers and respecting
civil liberties. Proponents of no-knock warrants have thus failed
to present a convincing explanation for why their continued use
is necessary or even desirable.
B.

No-Knock Warrants & The Presumption of Innocence

Another important principle underlying the knock-andannounce requirement is that the suspect should be given the
opportunity to voluntarily comply with the law.122 This principle
is rooted in the presumption of innocence, one of the hallmarks of

118
119
120

Id. at 287.
Id. at 291.
Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38; Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note

23.
121
See supra Part I.A and accompanying notes. Most knock-and-announce
statutes explicitly state that an officer may force entry if he or she is refused
admittance after providing notice of his or her authority and purpose. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3109 (2012) (“The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window
of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant,
if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance . . . .”).
122
Garcia, supra note 32, at 690–91.
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our legal system.123 No-knock warrants are necessarily based on
the assumption that the person inside will refuse to comply with
the search warrant, attempt to forcibly resist the officer’s entry
into the house, attempt to escape, or attempt to destroy
evidence.124 No-knock warrants go one step further than
assuming that the person has incriminating evidence to destroy;
they assume that, if the police knock and announce their
presence, then the person will commit the additional crime of
destroying the evidence or violently resisting the officer’s efforts
to execute the search warrant.125
C.

Mistaken Identity, Inaccurate Information, and Insufficient
Judicial Scrutiny

In addition to providing an opportunity to comply with the
law, the knock-and-announce requirement enables police to
ensure they have the right address and, if they don’t, it gives
residents a chance to inform the police they have the wrong
address and redirect them before the police crash through their
front door.126 After the Manafort raid, author and legal analyst
Jeffrey Toobin expressed the belief that magistrate judges put
search warrant applications under a great deal of scrutiny.127
Senator Richard Blumenthal expressed a similar belief128 and
further suggested that no-knock warrants are reserved for “the
most serious criminal investigations.”129
Unfortunately,
magistrate
judges
give
no-knock
130
authorization lightly and routinely, sometimes when the police
123
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 56 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“It need hardly be said that not every suspect is in fact guilty of
the offense of which he is suspected, and that not everyone who is in fact guilty will
forcibly resist arrest or attempt to escape or destroy evidence.”).
124
See id.
125
See id.
126
Garcia, supra note 32, at 690–91.
127
Balko, No-Knock Raids, supra note 14 (“Magistrate judges don’t give
authorizations for searches of people’s homes lightly. I mean, this is a big deal.”).
128
Leonnig et al., supra note 8 (“[A] federal judge signing this warrant would
demand persuasive evidence of probable cause that a serious crime has been
committed.”). Id.
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23 (finding that out of 105
warrant requests, the Little Rock Police Department requested no-knock
authorization in 103 and that criminal court judges granted the no-knock request in
at least 101). Moreover, in 97 of those 105 cases, police did not provide any specific
information for why a no-knock warrant was needed for that particular suspect.
Radley Balko, How Little Rock’s Illegal Police Raids Validate the Exclusionary Rule,
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officers themselves have not even requested it.131 In practice,
“probable cause is a pretty low bar”132 and warrants are generally
issued on something more like “possible cause” than “probable
cause.”133 The average length of magisterial review of search
warrant applications is approximately two minutes and
forty-eight seconds, and some are approved in less than a
minute.134
Federal magistrates scrutinize warrants more
carefully than state court judges, and the most scrutinized
warrants are in complex white-collar cases.135 Therefore, most
no-knock warrants issued by state judges and magistrates to
state law enforcement are likely put under much less scrutiny
than the no-knock warrant in Manafort’s case. Moreover,
magistrate-shopping is a common practice because police in a
given jurisdiction know which judges are more liberal in
approving search warrant applications.136
Simply put, it is much easier to get a no-knock warrant than
many believe. This reality helps to explain the myriad of

WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/
2018/10/19/how-little-rocks-illegal-police-raids-validate-the-exclusionary-rule/?utm_
term=.38a5e1086e15 [hereinafter Balko, Little Rock and the Exclusionary Rule]. In
two cases, the police cited evidence of lawful gun ownership—the suspect’s concealed
carry permit—as evidence of that suspect’s threat to officer safety. Id.
131
See, e.g., BALKO, OVERKILL, supra note 100, at 24–25, 35 (citing a Denver
Post study, which found that no-knock warrant requests were rubber-stamped with
little to no scrutiny).
132
Ken White, We Interrupt This Grand Jury Lawsplainer For a Search
Warrant Lawsplainer, POPEHAT (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.popehat.com/2017/
08/09/we-interrupt-this-grand-jury-lawsplainer-for-a-search-warrant-lawsplainer/.
133
Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood CommonLaw History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 58 (2007); see
also BALKO, OVERKILL, supra note 100, at 21–25 (discussing the problem of
“notoriously unreliable” confidential informants and providing examples of
informant corruption).
134
See Van Duizend et al., supra note 24; Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra
note 23; Miller & Wieber, supra note 24; Editorial, Getting a Warrant, supra note 24.
135
White, supra note 132.
136
See Van Duizend et al., supra note 24, at 104-05 (“Judge shopping is
practiced by search warrant applicants . . . . Again, the extent of the problem varies,
but when the procedures permit selection of the magistrate who will review a
warrant, judge-shopping occurs.”). Moreover, the authors of that report note that
“police supervisory personnel frequently review warrant applications before they rae
presented to a magistrate[,]” and that “[t]he intensity of this preliminary
involvement varies, in much the same way as the magisterial review itself, from a
eprfunctory review to actual drafting of the affidavit.” Id. at 50. Finally, the authors
indicate that they “heard complaints that inexperienced assistant prosecutors who
know comparatively little about the law concerning search warrants are assigned to
conduct the reviews, resulting in “prosecutor shopping.” Id. at 51.
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examples of no-knock warrants executed at the wrong address,137
or executed at the right address, only for police to learn that their
information was bad and the person they were looking for moved
out long ago.138 Nor are no-knock search warrants confined to the
most serious criminal investigations. In fact, the majority of
them are issued in connection with routine, low-level drug
investigations.139
That no-knock warrants are put under
insufficient judicial scrutiny is also evidenced by the nearly
one-third of investigations that turn up minimal quantities of
drugs or none at all.140 This suggests that no-knock warrants are
regularly used in cases that are far from even the most serious
drug investigations, let alone the most serious criminal
investigations generally. Even when no-knock warrants are
executed at the correct address and against the correct target,
their use is hard to justify because of the high risk of danger to
the suspect, to police officers themselves, and to any other
innocent third-parties in the house or nearby.141 That they are
subjected to insufficient judicial scrutiny and are often executed
at the wrong address or based on flawed information further
solidifies the argument that no-knock warrants have no
legitimate place in law enforcement.

137

BALKO, OVERKILL, supra note 100, at 43–63.
See, e.g., Phonesavanh, supra note 49; McKinley Jr., supra note 2.
139
Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38. A particularly damning review of Little
Rock’s use of no-knock warrants highlights this:
Of the 105 warrants I reviewed, the police claimed to have found some
quantity of illicit drugs in 85, leaving 20 raids that turned up no
contraband at all. But even among those 85, they rarely found a significant
quantity of the drug they claimed their informant had purchased. In some,
they claimed to have found “residue” of a “powder” or “leafy substance,” but
it isn’t clear whether those substances were ever tested. In others they
claimed to have found a “pill bottle” or “pills,” without always revealing
what the pills were, or whether the owner had a prescription for them. In
35 of the 105 no-knock raids, the police only had probable cause to search
for marijuana. In eight others, they found only marijuana despite obtaining
a search warrant for harder drugs.
Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23.
140
ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 34.
141
See BALKO, OVERKILL, supra note 100, at 63–71; Balko, Little Rock’s Drug
War, supra note 23 (“There were two 6-year-olds and a 13-year-old in that house,
along with my mother, who’s paralyzed from the waist down. They blew the front
and back doors right off the wall. And I don’t mean they blew the door open. I mean
there was no door left.”).
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D. No-Knock Warrants & Race
There is a large and growing body of scholarship detailing
the disproportionate impact of the criminal justice system on
people of color.142 No-knock warrants appear to be no different in
that there is evidence that they are used disproportionately
against people of color.143 As one victim of a no-knock raid gone
wrong put it, “This is about race. You don’t see SWAT teams
going into a white-collar community, throwing grenades into
their homes.”144
As previously discussed, no-knock warrants began primarily
as, and remain, a tool of the War on Drugs.145 Viewed in this
light, it is not especially surprising that no-knock warrants are
disproportionately used against suspects of color because the War
on Drugs, from its inception, has disproportionately impacted
people and communities of color.146 This has long been an open
secret.147 The disproportionate use of no-knock warrants against
people of color means that minority communities bear the brunt
of the death and property destruction associated with no-knock
raids.148 Especially in communities where relationships between
142
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (revised ed. 2012);
PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017); JAMES FORMAN JR.,
LOCKING UP OUR OWN (2017); MATT TAIBBI, I CAN’T BREATHE: A KILLING ON BAY
STREET (2017).
143
See Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23 (“Nearly all the people
raided that I spoke to were lower-income, and all but one were black. Of the 105
warrants I reviewed, 84 were for black suspects, 16 were for white and five were for
Latinos. Little Rock as a whole is 46 percent white and 42 percent black. Hispanics
and Latinos of any race make up just under 7 percent of the population.”); ACLU,
WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 35 (“According to the records that did contain
race information, SWAT team deployment primarily impacted people of color.”).
144
ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 14 (quoting Alecia
Phonesavanh, whose nineteen-month-old baby was severely injured by a flash-bang
grenade during a no-knock raid).
145
Supra Part I.C.
146
See Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or
Why the “War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks”, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 382
(2002) (arguing that African-Americans, and African-American males in particular,
are the primary target of the government’s War on Drugs); see also Erik Luna, Drug
War and Peace, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 833–37 (2016); Kimberly D. Bailey,
Watching Me: The War on Crime, Privacy, and the State, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1539,
1551–52 (2014).
147
Nixon’s chief domestic policy advisor openly acknowledged that the
administration “knew [they] couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or
black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks
with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, [they] could disrupt those
communities.” ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 133 (2017).
148
Nunn, supra note 146, at 404.
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police and civilians are already strained, the use of no-knock
warrants can create further tensions and give off the impression
that police are something akin to a military occupational force.149
There is also some evidence, albeit anecdotal, that black and
white suspects who use weapons in self-defense during no-knock
raids are treated differently by the legal system.150
To be sure, prohibiting no-knock warrant use will not solve
the many other race-based problems associated with drug
enforcement specifically and the criminal justice system more
generally.
However, recognizing that no-knock warrants
disproportionately impact people of color is important to a
comprehensive understanding of why no-knock warrants are
uniquely problematic.
III. A NEW DIRECTION: LEGISLATIVE PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE
NO-KNOCK WARRANT PROBLEM
First, state legislatures should enact laws expressly
prohibiting state magistrates from issuing no-knock warrants.
Anything short of this, such as the Utah legislation eliminating
no-knock warrants in drug possession cases,151 is a half-measure.
Two states, Florida and Oregon, already completely prohibit the
use of no-knock warrants.152 It is clear that no-knock warrants
are a tool fraught with inherent danger153 and, if states are
serious about ensuring the safety of both civilians and police
officers, are a tool that should be abandoned entirely. A return
to the time-tested knock-and-announce requirement is the most
meaningful way to accomplish these goals. Of course, proponents
of no-knock warrants argue that they ensure officer safety.154
However, the reality is that although no-knock warrants are a
relatively recent development,155 the danger associated with their
The knock-and-announce
use is already apparent.156
requirement, which is also meant to ensure officer safety, has

149

Id.
See Sack, Murder or Self-Defense?, supra note 103 (describing the divergent
stories of two suspects, one black and one white, who shot at and killed police
officers during no-knock raids and whose cases played out very differently).
151
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210(8) (West 2015).
152
See relevant discussion supra Part I.E and accompanying notes.
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See Part II.A.
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demonstrated its value and importance over several centuries.157
Moreover, ending the use of no-knock warrants does not
necessarily preclude police from making an unannounced entry
when they determine on the scene that an appropriate exigency
exists.158 The on-the-scene assessment of circumstances is critical
for police to determine if changed circumstances have obviated
the need for a no-knock entry or suggest that a no-knock entry is
unwise; however, in practice, police do not always make an
on-the-scene assessment once they have obtained a no-knock
Eliminating the use of no-knock warrants, in
warrant.159
connection with the two other legislative proposals discussed
below, would ensure that police perform a complete, thorough
assessment of the situation when they arrive on scene to execute
a search warrant before deciding whether to dispense with
knocking and announcing their presence.
Second, states should enact legislation requiring execution of
traditional search warrants during daylight hours, roughly
defined as between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.160 It is relatively common
to execute traditional knock-and-announce search warrants at
night.161 Serving traditional knock-and-announce warrants in
the middle of the night undermines the entire purpose of the
knock-and-announce requirement because it is unlikely that a
person who is asleep will be able to wake up, get out of bed, and
reach the front door in the very short amount of time that elapses
before police force entry.162 In order for the knock-and-announce
requirement to serve the purposes it was historically meant to
serve, persons inside the home must have a real, meaningful
opportunity to answer the door and comply with the lawful
execution of the search warrant. The most effective way to
157

See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 605–06 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 623 (noting that even without a no-knock warrant, police retain the
authority to exercise their independent judgment regarding the wisdom of carrying
out a no-knock entry at the time the warrant is executed); see also supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
159
Phonesavanh, supra note 49; Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20
(police claimed not to have any evidence that children were in the house despite the
presence of children’s toys on the front lawn at the scene, suggesting police did not
conduct any on-site review of the situation before executing the warrant).
160
See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(2)(B) (defining “daytime” as between 6:00 a.m.
and 10:00 p.m. local time).
161
Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38 (reporting that in Utah, 18.1% of search
warrants executed by SWAT teams were knock-and-announce raids at night).
162
Id.; see also United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 38–39 (2003) (finding that
forcing entry fifteen to twenty seconds after knocking and announcing was
constitutionally reasonable).
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guarantee that residents have such an opportunity is to require
execution of all search warrants during daylight hours. This is
when people are more likely to be both awake and able to get to
the door, or out of the house altogether, substantially reducing
the risk of a confrontation. Moreover, there is evidence that
police typically comply with the warrant instructions when a
judge signs off on a warrant requiring service during daytime
hours.163
Finally, in order to ensure meaningful compliance with the
knock-and-announce requirement, state courts should apply the
exclusionary
rule
to
evidence
obtained
through
knock-and-announce violations under their state constitutions, as
In reaching its
a few state courts have already done.164
conclusion that suppression is not necessary in cases of
knock-and-announce violations, the United States Supreme
Court grossly underestimated the historical and practical
importance of the knock-and-announce requirement and the
purposes it serves.165
These interests are far from
inconsequential, and as recent history has made clear, no-knock
warrants come with a significant risk to the safety of both police
officers and persons inside the house,166 not to mention people
nearby who might be caught in the crossfire or hit by stray
bullets.167 In order to ensure meaningful compliance with the
knock-and-announce rule, application of the exclusionary rule to
evidence obtained through knock-and-announce violations is
essential.168 State courts can provide greater constitutional

163
Balko, Little Rock and the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 130 (“[O]f the 80
instances in which a judge instructed Little Rock police to serve the warrant during
the day, the officers complied with those instructions.”).
164
See, e.g., State v. Jean-Paul, 295 P.3d 1072, 1077 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013);
Berumen v. State, 182 P.3d 635, 637 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008), State v. Robinson, 944
A.2d 718, 720–21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 974 A.2d
1057 (2009) (holding that suppression of evidence is the appropriate remedy for
violation of the knock-and-announce requirement under the respective state
constitutions).
165
Supra notes 41–45 and accompanying discussion. See also Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 620–22 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
166
Supra Part II. A.
167
Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20 (“Stray bullets have whizzed
through neighboring homes, and in dozens of instances the victims of police gunfire
have included the family dog.”).
168
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 629 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is
common sense that “without suppression there is little to deter knock-and-announce
violations”); see also id. at 621 (arguing that failure to comply with the knock-andannounce rule renders a search unlawful and unlawful searches require suppression
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protections for their citizens under their state constitutions than
the federal Constitution requires, and state courts should take
advantage of this power with regard to knock-and-announce
violations.
Opponents of applying the exclusionary rule to
knock-and-announce violations argue that alternatives to
suppression, such as civil lawsuits, internal police discipline, and
citizen review boards, are sufficient to deter knock-and-announce
violations.169 However, available data and experience suggest
that these alternate remedies are grossly insufficient,170 and that
the exclusionary rule is the most effective way to deter police
misconduct.171 Of course, there is a social cost that comes with
suppressing evidence, but the social cost is no greater in the
knock-and-announce context than when the exclusionary rule is
applied to other Fourth Amendment violations.172 The deterrent
value of exclusion outweighs the social cost of fewer convictions
because of the very real risk to the safety of both police and
civilians associated with no-knock entries. Therefore, to ensure
meaningful
compliance
with
the
knock-and-announce
requirement and deter violations, application of the exclusionary
rule to knock-and-announce violations is indispensable.
Taken together, these three proposals provide a more
comprehensive framework to end the use of no-knock warrants
and usher in a return to strict compliance with the
knock-and-announce requirement than current efforts to reform
no-knock warrant use.

of the evidence obtained as a result); Balko, Little Rock and the Exclusionary Rule,
supra note 130 (arguing that application of the exclusionary rule to evidence
obtained after knock-and-announce violations significantly increases compliance
with the knock-and-announce rule).
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Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596–99 (majority opinion).
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Id. at 607–11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171
Totten & Cobkit, supra note 65, at 101–02 (reporting that nearly sixty-five
percent of police chiefs perceive exclusion as having a substantial impact in
deterring knock-and-announce violations while only 14.3% perceived community
oversight as having any substantial impact); Balko, Little Rock and the Exclusionary
Rule, supra note 130 (“When Little Rock police and judges know that a rule will be
enforced by suppression of evidence, they complied with that rule at least 76 percent
of the time. . . . But when it’s a rule not enforced by suppressing evidence, they at
most complied 8 percent of the time.”) (emphasis in original). See generally Yale
Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 119 (2003).
172
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 629–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
“It would have been a lot easier if someone would have
announced themselves, man,” said Marvin Guy, who is awaiting
trial on capital murder and attempted capital murder charges for
shooting at police executing a no-knock warrant because he
believed he was being robbed.173 In response, an officer explained
to him that the purpose of no-knock entries is ensuring officer
safety.174 This disconnect cuts to the heart of the problem with
no-knock warrants. Actors on both sides—the unsuspecting
homeowner and police officers—believe their own safety is in
danger. Although no-knock warrants are purportedly justified by
concerns about officer safety, in practice, they create a
substantial risk of violent confrontation between homeowners
and law enforcement officers. No-knock warrants have already
taken a substantial toll and the remedies states have proposed
and adopted to date are insufficient. It is therefore imperative
that states act to eliminate their use and shepherd a return to
strict compliance with the knock-and-announce requirement.
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Sack, Murder or Self-Defense?, supra note 103.
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